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Quantum digital signatures apply quantum mechanics to the problem of guaranteeing message integrity and nonrepudiation with information-theoretical security, which are complementary to the confidentiality realized by quantum key distribution. Previous experimental demonstrations have been limited to transmission distances of less than 5 km of optical fiber in a laboratory setting. Here we report the first demonstration of quantum digital signatures over installed optical fiber as well as the longest transmission link reported to date. This demonstration used a 90-km long differential phase shift quantum key distribution system to achieve approximately one signed bit per second -an increase in the signature generation rate of several orders of magnitude over previous optical fiber demonstrations.
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For many years, it was generally trusted that a simple handwritten signature was hard to forge and, therefore, could be taken as certification that the signatory was willing to be considered a source of the message and agreed with the contents. In addition, there was an acceptance that a signed message would be validated by a third party, which allowed complex transaction systems to operate with reasonable ease.
The field of digital signatures seeks to restore some of the practical security aspects of handwritten signatures lost in the transition to digital communications. Digital signatures must guarantee no forging (that a message is signed by the legitimate sender and has not been modified), and non-repudiation (Alice cannot repudiate her message, that is, successfully deny that she sent it). Currently used digital signature schemes typically rely on "one-way" functions, which are computationally easy to evaluate in one direction but computationally difficult to invert without additional information. However, there is no existing proof of the long-term security of these signature schemes and they are vulnerable to algorithmic breakthroughs, emerging quantum data processing technologies and even significant large-scale investment in conventional computational technologies, -thus they only offer "computational security" against an attacker with currently accepted standards of reasonable computational resources.
Naturally, there is strong motivation to develop digital signature schemes that offer "information-theoretical security", meaning that they are secure against all attackers, even those with unlimited computational resources Wegman-Carter message authentication offers information-theoretical security. However, to guarantee non-repudiation as well, one possibility is to use quantum digital signatures. QDS schemes operate using technology similar to that of QKD but employ protocols that do not require distillation of a fully secret key. Indeed, it is possible that both QKD and QDS schemes can work in parallel along the same optical fibers. This paper demonstrates the first implementation of QDS in an installed 
